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Constitutional Limitations on Government
Disclosure of Private Trade Secret Information
The value of trade secret information' arises from the competitive ad-
vantage associated with a competitor's ignorance. 2 Once disclosed to a
competitor, the information cannot be recalled and substantive law does
not protect it from further dissemination.' Consequently, a business
may expend considerable resources to protect its trade secret informa-
tion from theft or unauthorized disclosure and to prevent the resulting
harm to its competitive advantage.'
The power of the federal government to demand and obtain valuable
private trade secret information is awesome.' In some instances, the in-
formation mandatorily submitted to administrative agencies is the most
valuable property a business owns." While submission of trade secret in-
formation to an administrative agency does not in itself destroy the
owner's property,' it undermines the business' efforts to maintain
I The phrase "trade secret information" will be used in this note to mean "trade secrets
and commercial or financial information." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). For other possible
definitions of "trade secret information," see notes 26-27 infra.
The essence of trade secret information is secrecy. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). As the United
States Court of Claims stated in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d
904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961): "[A] trade secret, as a tool for commercial competition, derives much
of its value from the fact of its secrecy. It is truly valuable only so long as it is a secret, for
only so long does it provide an advantage over competitors."
3 See L.S. Donaldson Co. v. La Maur, Inc., 299 F.2d 412, 424-25 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 815 (1962); Northup v. Reish, 200 F.2d 924, 926-29 (7th Cir. 1953); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Costle, 481 F. Supp. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Speciner v. Reynolds Metal Co., 177 F.
Supp. 291, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd mem., 279 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1960).
See Stessin, How to Guard Trade Secrets, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1973, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
See generally 1 R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.04 (1980).
5 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-46, 48-49 (1976 & Supp. m 1979) (FTC); id. § 78u (1976) (SEC);
21 id. § 355 (FDA); 42 id. § 7607 (Supp. mI 1979) (EPA). See generally Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420, 454-85 app. (1960); see also In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d
685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978); A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515 (3d
Cir. 1976).
6 See Comment, A Review of the Fourth Exemption of the Freedom of Information
Act; 9 AKRON L. REv. 673, 684 (1976) ("The importance of a court's decision on disclosure in
any given case is magnified by the fact that a number of jobs and possibly the future of a
business may hinge on obtaining a given contract, depending on the industry involved and a
number of other factors."), quoted in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d
1190, 1213 n.74 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
"[The] necessary element of secrecy is not lost ... if the holder of the trade secret
reveals the trade secret to another 'in confidence, and under an implied obligation not to
use or disclose it.'" Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); see RESTATE-
ME9T OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 6 (1939) (limited disclosure not incompatible with trade
secret protection).
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secrecy by subjecting that property to careless handling and to the
significant possibility of public disclosure
The basic objective of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)9 is
disclosure." When he signed the Act into law, President Lyndon B.
Johnson emphasized "the people's right to know."'1 Throughout the fif-
teen years it has been in existence, however, the FOIA has been utilized
chiefly as a tool of business; businesses regularly use the FOIA to un-
cover competitors' trade secret information. 3 One company's experience
See generally Briel for Appellees, Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1980).
Appellee Wearly sought to enjoin enforcement of an FTC subpoena duces tecum
because, according to Wearly: its confidential information might be disclosed to competitors
in violation of its fourth and fifth amendment rights. Wearly alleged 18 instances of the
FTC's failure to protect confidential information through carelessness or outright refusal.
For example; the Secretary of the FTC sent 15 notices to his staff requesting information
on the "whereabouts of numerous document binders," Brief for Appellees, supra, at 36-37.
The FTC was twice ordered to remove in camera documents from the public record: Id. at
36. Pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from a party engaged in
litigation, with Coca-Cola Bottling Co., the FTC decided to release Coca-Cola's sales and
marketing data, disregarding two protective orders and the specific objections of an ad-
ministrative law judge. Id. at 34. The FTC, ignoring its prior confidentiality grant, released
various cigarette manufacturers' data on sales and advertising expenditures admittedly ex-
empt from disclosure, notifying the manufacturers only after it had released the informa-
tion. Id. at 33; cf. FTC, ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES, RULES OF PRACTICE, AND STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT 93 (1971) ("Assurances of confidentiality given by Commission staff are not bind-
ing upon the Commission."); N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1975, § 3, at 8, col. 1 ("And what are the
lawyers getting for their business clients? The common assumption is that trade secrets are
flowing out of Washington like government directives, that in every industry 'Coca-Cola
formulas' are being revealed.").
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
10 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290 (1979); Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361
(1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
11 H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) (quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson
at the signing of the FOIA on July 4, 1966). The FOIA "is fundamentally designed to inform
the public about agency action and not to benefit private litigants." NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975). It also is not designed to serve as a "tool of
discovery." Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercroft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974). For a
discussion of the legislative purpose behind the FOIA, see note 20 infra.
1 See Hearings on Oversight of the Freedom of Information Act Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings] (statement of Sherwin
Gardner, Deputy Commissioner, FDA) ("[M]ore than 80 percent [of the FDA's FOIA re-
quests] in 1976 ... originated from industry or persons working on their behalf."); id. at 14
(statement of Gerald P. Norton, Deputy General Counsel, FTC) ("In the first half of 1977 .... of
the 375 Freedom of Information Act requests received by the Commission, 273 came from
businesses or corporations or their lawyers."); id. at 29 (testimony of Michael A. James, Depu-
ty General Counsel, EPA) (estimating that 80% of the FOIA requests received by the EPA
come from commercial interests); Arnold, Who's Going Fishing in Government Files?, Juns
DOCTOR, April, 1976, at 17, 18 (estimating that over 2/3 of all FOIA requests come from
business).
13 Says Barbara Keehn, the FTC Freedom of Information Chief [of the constant
efforts by firms to acquire trade secrets of competitors]: "It's a form of in-
dustrial espionage, except that they do it under the law. We get very few re-
quests from journalists and consumer groups. That's too bad, because that's
who the law was written for."
TIME, Dec. 19, 1977, at 23, 24.
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with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) exemplifies the
scenario which those who submit trade secret information fear most.'4
Air Cruisers Company designed and, in August, 1975, obtained FAA ap-
proval for a forty-two person inflatable life raft--the largest raft ever to
gain FAA approval. As part of its application, Air Cruisers submitted
performance tests and design information to the agency. In February,
1976, Air Cruisers learned only at the last moment that the FAA intend-
ed to release that information in response to a FOIA request from Air
Cruisers' competitor, Switlik Parachute Company. Air Cruisers main-
tained that release of the information could damage its competitive ad-
vantage by allowing Switlik to build and certify a comparable raft with-
out expending the effort and incurring the expense that Air Cruisers
had in meeting the cumbersome certification procedures. While Air
Cruisers succeeded in forcing the FAA to withhold some of the informa-
tion, the documents released to Switlik helped that company design its
own raft and outbid Air Cruisers for a valuable European contract.'5 Air
Cruisers' experience is neither unique nor unusual.'8
The inequities arising from government release of confidential
documents have received considerable judicial attention. The United
States Supreme Court, in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,' recognized that
those who submit trade secret information to an agency have a right to
judicial review of the agency's decision to disclose that information in
response to a FOIA request. The Chrysler opinion, however, left open a
number of issues and did not consider the constitutional limitations on
disclosure which may be imposed by the fifth amendment. 8 The Court
did not reach the question of what steps must be taken prior to the
disclosure of information in order to satisfy the requirements of pro-
"Schorr, Telling Tales-How Law Is Being Used to Pry Business Secrets from Uncle
Sam's Files, Wall St. J., May 9, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
," "'It's amazing what a $2 telex message will do,' says Mr. Switlik of the company's re-
quest to the FAA for the information." Id.
" See generally Kiplinger Wash. Letter, Mar. 30, 1979 ("Misuse of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act is getting out of hand. Businesses are being hurt, their secrets revealed to com-
petitors. Data given to gov't under various other laws are open to anyone who asks.") (em-
phasis omitted); Tuthill, The Problems of Privacy, NATION'S Bus., Mar., 1979, at 39 ("[S]avvy
business people have flooded government agencies with FOIA requests to learn com-
petitors' trade secrets."); Freedom of Information Act Windfall CHEM. WEEK, Jan. 4, 1978,
at 37 ("The great majority [of the 25,000 FOIA requests received by the FDA per year] in-
volve what one FDA official terms 'industrial espionage'- efforts to get a fix on com-
petitors' activities.").
Reckless disclosure of trade secret information has injured government interests as well.
See 1 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 14.17 (1979) (discussing Sikorsky
Aircraft's withdrawal from a multimilion dollar government contract because of the
Department of Transportation's failure to provide FOIA protection).
7 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
" The petitioner, Chrysler, specifically raised fifth amendment questions concerning the
taking of privateproperty for private use and the taking of private property without com-
pensation. Brief for Petitioner at 24 n.26:
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cedural due process. Instead, it recognized a statutory limitation on cer-
tain disclosures and thereby avoided the need to consider more per-
vasive constitutional restraints on a broader class of disclosures.
Trade secret information is property.9 A trade secret owner
threatened with the release of his information therefore merits the pro-
cedural due process safeguards of clear and timely notice and the oppor-
tunity to be heard. In addition, the fifth amendment prohibition against
governmental takings of private property for public use without com-
pensation should completely bar the disclosure of certain trade secret
information.
THE FOIA AND CHRYSLER CORP. V. BROWN
The FOIA was enacted to more fully inform the electorate about its
government.2° While emphasizing that the successful implementation of
the Act requires the fullest responsible disclosure of information,2 the
Act also recognizes the need to observe "principles of confidentiality
and privacy."' Protection of these principles is ensured by nine exemp-
19 See text accompanying notes 43-52 infra.
441 U.S. at 290 n.10.
As was stated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
The broad legislative intent behind the enactment of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act . . . was to give the electorate greater access to information
concerning the operations of the federal government. The ultimate purpose
was to enable the public to have sufficient information in order to be able,
through the electoral process, to make intelligent, informed choices with
respect to the nature, scope, and procedure of federal governmental activities.
Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972) (citing S. REP.
No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418); accord, H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1972) (FOIA emerged "from one of our most essential principles: a democracy works best
when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits") (quoting
President Lyndon B. Johnson at the signing of the FOIA on July 4,1966); Freedom of Informa-
tion and Secrecy in Government- Hearings on S. 186 Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959) (state-
ment of William H. Fitzpatrick) ("[A]n uninformed people must, in the end, become a misin-
formed people. And a misinformed people, while they may be told that they are safest and
happiest in their serfdom to secrecy, are not a free people.").
21 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (successful implementation of the Act
"lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all in-
terests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure").
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information
Section of the Administrative Procedure Act at iv (June, 1967). Attorney General Ramsey
Clark counseled all executive agencies that the Act
gives assurance to the individual citizen that his private rights will not be
violated. The individual deals with the Government in a number of protected
relationships which could be destroyed if the right to know were not
modulated by principles of confidentiality and privacy. Such materials as tax
reports, medical and personnel files, and trade secrets must remain outside
the zone of accessibility.
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tions." Exemption four,24 the "trade secrets exemption," was intended
to "assure the confidentiality of information obtained by the Govern-
ment ... [which] would not customarily be made public by the person
from whom it was obtained."25
Under the common law, business or technical information which
potentially confers a competitive advantage on its owner is recognized
as a trade secret." This common law definition of a trade secret has
been adopted by the courts to delineate the scope of FOIA exemption
four." Business information comes within the exemption if it is "(1) com-
mercial or financial, (2) obtained from a person outside the government
and (3) privileged or confidential."' Information is privileged or con-
fidential if it is of the type that is not generally disclosed to the public
= See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
Exemption four, id § 552(b)(4), provides that the "FOIA does not apply to matters that
are ... trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained fiom a person and
privileged or confidential."
I H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2418, 2427.
" "Trade secret" is defined in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), as
"any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business,
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it:' Id. at 474-75 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b, at 5
(1939)); accord, UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4); cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) ("most commonly accepted definition of trade secrets is restricted
to confidential information which is not disclosed in the normal process of exploitation")
(citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b, at 5 (1939)); H.R. REP. No. 1382, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1978) (distinguishing "trade secret" from "commercial or financial in-
formation" and finding the distinction a nullity for FOIA purposes). See generally 1 R.
MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 2.01.
' See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976); Washington
Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Generally, in FOIA exemption four cases courts adopt the common law rule stated in
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b, at 5 (1939): "The subject matter of a trade secret
must be secret." See cases cited in 1 R. MILORIM, supra note 4, § 2.01 n.2. For a discussion of
the scope of the definition, see Note, Would Macy's Tell Gimbel's: Government-Controlled
Business Information and the Freedom of Information Ac Forwards & Backwards, 6 Loy.
CHI. L.J. 594, 598-602 (1975); notes 44-52 & accompanying text infra.
Courts in FOIA cases have included a variety of things within the definition of trade
secret information. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Induss., Inc. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (profit rates); Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976) (customer and
supplier lists); Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975) (customer and supplier
lists), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); Washington Research Project Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d
238, 244 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (profit-oriented research work), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975);
Sterling Drug v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (business sales statistics); Thrifty Drug
Stores Co. v. FTC, 1976-2 Trade Cas. 70,408 (D.D.C. 1976) (overhead and operating costs);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Coleman, 432 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (manufacturing
data); Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. AEC, 380 F.
Supp. 630 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (applied industrial technology); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355
F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1973) (business sales statistics).
" Gulf & W. Induss., Inc. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (paraphras-
ing language of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976)); accord, National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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and that, if disclosed, would "cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the person from whom the information was obtained.""
Despite the substantial harm which could result from the disclosure
of trade secret information, the Supreme Court in Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown"0 held that the FOIA trade secret information exemption is
discretionary" and creates no mandatory bar to disclosure.2 Writing for
a unanimous court, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the exemption
standing alone guarantees the confidentiality of information only to the
extent that the agency possessing the information is willing not to
disclose it.' By finding that the FOIA left agencies unlimited discretion
to disclose or not to disclose information, even though specifically
within one of the nine exemptions, Chrysler established that the Act
does not afford those who submit information a direct private cause of
action to enjoin agency disclosure. 4
The Supreme Court did not, however, leave submitters of trade
secret information without any available means to protect assertedly
confidential information from disclosure. It recognized that the Trade
Secrets Act35 places "substantive limits" 6 on agency action for informa-
' National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974); ac-
cord, Gulf & W. Induss., Inc. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
3 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Chrysler, as a government contractor, was required to submit in-
formation concerning its affirmative action program (AAP) and work force composition. In
May of 1975, Chrysler learned that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the agency
responsible for monitoring its employment practices, intended to release Chrysler's 1974
AAP report together with other employment information pursuant to an FOIA request.
Chrysler sought to enjoin DLA's intended disclosure of the information. The district court
held that the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), required the withholding of some
of the information. 441 U.S. at 286-89. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit establish-
ed that § 1905 only bars disclosures "not authorized by law." Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger,
565 F.2d 1172, 1186 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979). Finding that certain regulations authorized the disclosure, the appellate court re-
jected the district court's conclusion. 565 F.2d at 1186-88.
"' 441 U.S. at 294 (concluding that "Congress did not limit an agency's discretion to
disclose information when it enacted the FOIA").
Id. at 291-93 (holding that "Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be man-
datory bars to disclosure".)
" Id. at 292-93. A review of the legislative history revealed that "the congressional con-
cern was with the agency's need or preference for confidentiality:' Id.
" Id. at 294. While those who request information have an express cause of action to en-
join an agency from withholding requested, nonexempt information, see 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B) (1976), no complementary cause of action was provided for those who submit in-
formation. 441 U.S. at 294. Submitters' attempts to enjoin FOIA-induced agency disclosures
have been popularly denominated "reverse FOIA suits." Id. at 285. See generally Campbell,
Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Need for Congressional Action, 67
GEO. L.J. 103 (1978); Clement, The Right of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of
Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55
TEx. L. REV. 587 (1977); Note, Protection from Government Disclosure-The Reverse-
FOIA Suit 1976 DUKE L.J. 330, 333-39; Note, Administrative Disclosure of Private
Business Records Under the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Alternative
Methods of Review, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 923 (1977).
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
441 U.S. at 317-18.
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tion disclosures "not authorized by law."3 Although it refused to read
that Act, a criminal statute, as providing civil remedies," the Court
found that a disclosure which violates the Trade Secrets Act is "not in
accordance with law"39 and is therefore proscribed by section 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)4° which does establish an indepen-
dent civil cause of action.4' Therefore, although the Trade Secrets Act
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
Chrysler claimed that the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), established a
private right to injunctive relief. 441 U.S. at 294. Applying the test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 79-80 (1975), the Court searched for some statutory basis to infer a civil cause of action.
Not finding one, it rejected § 1905 as an independent ground to enjoin disclosure. 441 U.S.
at 316-17.
Chrysler had claimed that disclosure of trade secret information pursuant to agency
regulations was not equivalent to disclosure "authorized by law" and that, absent a specific
authorization by Congress, release of its information would violate the Trade Secrets Act.
Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1186 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated sub nom. Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Justice Rehnquist rejected that argument by
reiterating that "properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the 'force and
effect of law.'" 441 U.S. at 295 (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); Foti
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217, 223 (1963); United States v. Mersky,
361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937)). To
have the force and effect of law, a regulation must meet three requirements. First, it must
be a substantive rule. That is, it must affect "individual rights and obligations." 441 U.S. at
301-02. Second, the regulation must have been promulgated in accordance with the pro-
cedural limitations imposed by Congress. Id. at 303. Third, the regulation must have been
promulgated pursuant to a congressional grant of rulemaking authority. Id. at 303-16. While
Chrysler does not explicitly so state, the congressional grant of authority must also be con-
stitutional. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690 (1949);
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937). A disclosure made pursuant to
a regulation which does not satisfy those three requirements is not authorized by law and,
therefore, violates § 1905. The FOIA is, by itself, insufficient authority to permit release of
confidential information. 441 U.S. at 303-04. See generally St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Harris,
604 F.2d 407, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that § 1106 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1306 (1976), authorized HEW disclosure regulations in satisfaction of § 1905); Cedars Nur-
sing & Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (same); Brookwood Medical Center v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 1247, 1249-50 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (same).
Although the Chrysler Court expressly declined to map the relative scope of exemption
four to the FOIA and the Trade Secrets Act, see 441 U.S. at 319 n.49, most courts have held
that § 1905 is no broader than exemption four. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4tb Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); Westchester
Gen. Hosp. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Fla. 1979; United States Reduction Co. v.
Adankus, No. 79 C 838 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 1979). See also Clement, supra note 34, at 602-17
(arguing that exemption four is broader than § 1905); Note, Chrysler Corporation v. Brown:
Seeking a Formula for Responsible Disclosure Under FOIA, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 1979-80
(1979) (considering the effect of the relative scope of exemption four and § 1905). Section
1905 prohibits disclosure of information relating to "trade secrets, processes, operations,
style of work or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source
of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation,
or association." 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). No case law concerning the scope of § 1905 exists.
For a history of the section, see O'Reilly, Government Disclosure of Private Secrets Under
the Freedom of Information Act, 30 Bus. LAw. 1125, 1135 n.62 (1975).
3, 441 U.S. at 317-18.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
" 441 U.S. at 318. A right to judicial review of agency action extends to persons
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). A court will set
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alone does not create a private civil cause of action, the Court found
that the Act is subsumed pro tanto into the APA which provides for
judicial review of an agency's decision to disclose trade secret informa-
tion."
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED LIMITATIONS ON DISCLOSURE
A claim alleging abuse of discretion based on the APA and arising out
of the failure to adequately protect trade secret information requires
some standard of protection against which to measure proper agency
discretion. The ultimate protection afforded property rights arises from
the fifth amendment imperative that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived
of ... property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." 3 Central to the two
clauses and to the scope of protection they establish is the concept of
property. An analysis of the problematic concept of property is
necessary to the recognition of trade secret owners' substantive rights.
Full comprehension of the property nature of trade secret informa-
aside an agency's action which is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." Id § 706(2)(A).
2 In response to the Chrysler decision, the Department of Justice has recommended,
and itself adopted, guidelines for federal agencies to follow in evaluating the propriety of
disclosing specific exempt information pursuant to an FOIA request. See Justice Dep't
Memorandum: Current and Future Litigation Under Chrysler v. Brown (June 21, 1979),
reprinted in 435 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. D-1 (1979); Justice Dep't Memorandum: State-
ment Concerning the Supreme Court's Decision in Chrysler v. Brown (June 15, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Justice Dep't Statement]. Specifically, the Department suggests that
prior to disclosure of trade secret information an agency should first determine whether
the information falls within both the FOIA exemption four and the substantive scope of the
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). (The Department declines to distinguish the
relative scopes of § 1905 and exemption four.) If the information does fall within both, the
agency must withhold it unless disclosure is authorized by a statute or regulation having
the force and effect of law. Even if an agency regulation or a statute authorizes disclosure
of specific FOIA-exempt material, the Department of Justice suggests that the likely harm
to the provider should be balanced against the public interest in disclosure before any deci-
sion to disclose is made. According to the Department, the unjustified release of informa-
tion governed by § 1905 "would be an abuse of discretion and, as such, contrary to law."
Justice Dep't Statement, supa, at 6. While the Justice Department test does not adopt the
constitutional limitations on trade secret disclosure imposed by the fifth amendment tak-
ings clause, see notes 91-149 & accompanying text infra, it approaches that standard. By
withholding information when the likely harm to the provider exceeds the public interest in
disclosure, agencies will satisfy the constitutional limitations more often than not. The
Justice Department standard fails, however, to the extent that it considers only the public
interest in disclosure. "[A] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of pay-
ing for the change." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); accord, Note,
Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due Process or a
Taking Without Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REV. 315, 317 (1979) ("[b]alancing private loss
against public gain should be used only to test for a violation of due process and not for a
taking without compensation."); see id. at 333-36.
" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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tion necessitates its division into two categories: first, inventive ideas,
formulas, processes, plans and technological information; and second,
commercial, confidential and financial information." Courts have had lit-
tle difficulty finding property rights in cases challenging the disclosure
of trade secret information falling within the first category.45 The
precise nature of rights attaching to the second category is less clear,
however." Where the secrecy of commercial, confidential and financial
information is critical to the continued existence of a business, an agen-
cy's decision to discl6se such information, failing to acknowledge its
value as property, may destroy the property interest in the "going con-
cern."'47 Although the courts have recognized the importance of commer-
" For an excellent discussion of the distinction between the two categories and the
kinds of information falling into each, see 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 52 (3d ed. 1968).
0 See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917); Fer-
roline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953); Aktiebolaget
Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1951); John T. Lloyd Laboratories, Inc. v.
Lloyd Bros. Pharmacists, Inc., 131 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1942); Herold v. Herold China & Pot-
tery Co., 257 F. 911 (6th Cir. 1919); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Costle, 481 F. Supp. 195
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135 (D.S.C. 1974); Dollac
Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41 (D.N.J. 1958); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F.
Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958); Bohlman v. American Paper Goods Co., 53 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J.
1943); Gronemeyer v. Hunter Mfg. Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 515, 106 A.2d 519 (1954); Progress
Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 208 Ky. 348, 270 S.W. 834 (1925); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass.
452 (1868); Godefroy Mfg. Co. v. Lady Lennox Co., 134 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. App. 1939); National
Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Induss. Inc., 273 A.D. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1948); Sachs v.
Cluett, Peabody & Co., 177 Misc. 695, 31 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 265 A.D. 497, 39 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1943); Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10
Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (Super. Ct. 1887); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d
763, cert denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958); Brown v. Fowler, 316 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
See generally 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 44, § 51.1(a); 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.01; H.
NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 141 (1947); A. TURNER, THE LAW
OF TRADE SECRETS 346-56 (1962); Maddock, Know How Licensing Under the Antitrust Laws
of the United States and the Rome Treaty, 2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 36, 41-45 (1964-1965);
Nash, The Concept of "Property" in Know-how as a Growing Area of Industrial Property:
Its Sale and Licensing, 6 PAT., T.M., & COPYRIGHT J. RESEARCH & EDUC. 289 (1962).
" Few courts have considered the propriety of the property label for commercial, con-
fidential and financial information. Of those which have, none has rejected the label. See,
e.g., Carson Prods. Co. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1979); Aluminum Co. of America v.
FPC, 130 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1942); American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d
236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Zotos Int'l, Inc. v. Kennedy, 460 F. Supp. 268, 272-73 (D.D.C. 1978).
See generally 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 44, § 51.1(b); see also Note, Trade Secret Protec-
tion of Non-Technical Competitive Information, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1164, 1177-82 (1969) (apply-
ing theories other than property to the protection of nontechnical information). Unlike in-
herently valuable technological trade secrets, commercial, confidential and financial infor-
mation is valuable and worthy of the property label only when its source is identified. See,
e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fisher v.
Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 112-14 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d
698, 708-09 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d
578 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Save the Dolphins v. Department of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407,
412-13 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Ponce v. Housing Auth., 389 F. Supp. 635, 653-54 (E.D. Cal. 1975);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 296-98 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
" See note 6 supra. Callmann argues that it is anomalous to deny trade secrets protec-
tion as property while granting such protection to goodwill, an intangible essential to the
value and existence of a business. 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 44, § 51.1(b). See also Aloi &
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cial, confidential and financial data, and have generally protected it
under a variety of theories, they have not usually done so under the pro-
perty rubric. 8 Significantly, the bulk of exemption four litigation has
concerned data outside the well recognized category of technical infor-
mation,49 and, as a result, has established a "new federal category of pro-
tectible proprietary data."5 Identifiable commercial, confidential and
financial information, as part of the "secret sphere"51 of a business, is in-
tegral to the going concern and, like the business itself, should be
Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Business Losses in Eminent Domain,
53 CORNELL L. REV. 604, 631-33 (1968).
a See, e.g., Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972) (damages awarded for
misappropriation of trade secrets consisting of detailed plan for creation, promotion, financ-
ing and sale of contracts for "prepaid" funeral services); Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d
1129 (8th Cir. 1969) (confidential information may not be disclosed by one who received it in
confidential relation); Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952) (constructive trust
imposed on geologistlemployee's profits realized by "purloining" company's confidential in-
formation and using it for own gain, to the company's detriment); International Election
Syss. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684, 707-08 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding market surveys pro-
tectible trade secrets); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 158-65 (D.D.C.
1976) (injunctive relief appropriate to prevent release by the Social Security Administration
of equal employment opportunity forms, affirmative action plans and compliance review
reports); Sum of Squares, Inc. v. Market Research Corp. of America, 401 F. Supp. 53, 54-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (party may protect its trade secrets by a nondisclosure clause in its con-
tracts without violating § 1 of the Sherman Act); Crocan Corp. v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 385
F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (recovery allowed for breach of confidential relation in mis-
appropriation of confidential information); Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135
(D.S.C. 1974) (unauthorized disclosure of a solution to the mechanical handling of an allot-
ment from a federal employee to a life insurance company in payment of a premium); Telex
Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 357 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (awarding damages, both general and
punitive, for willful misappropriation of "information found ... clearly [to] fall within the
definition of formula [sic], patterns, business plans . . . or technical knowledge"), affd in
part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Hagen,
363 F. Supp. 1325, 1329, 1331 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) (restraining defendant company's use of con-
fidential customer information obtained from plaintiff's former employee in violation of
employment contract); Snelling & Snelling, Inc. v. Armel, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1319, 1320-21
(W.D. La. 1973) (damages awarded for unauthorized use of plaintiffs procedures, techniques
and method of operation). See generally Note, Congressional Treatment of Confidential
Business Information: Proposals to Avert Unwarranted Disclosure, 52 IND. L.J. 769 (1977);
Note, supra note 46, at 1177-82.
49 The states have considered category two financial information only rarely, but
generally have protected it. See, e.g., People ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v.
Keane, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1094-97, 309 N.E.2d 362, 366-67 (1973) (finding government dis-
closure of confidential financial information severely limited by the Illinois constitution);
William Kaufman Assocs. v. Levy, 74 Misc. 2d 209, 214-17, 345 N.Y.S.2d 836, 843-45 (1973)
(noting that, while no trade secrets were contained in the submitted information, highly
confidential financial information may not be disclosed "to the possible advantage of com-
petitors").
0 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 6.02A[2]. A protectible interest must be recognized in
state law in order to characterize that interest as property. See text accompanying note 54
infra.
51 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 44, § 51.1(b).
The secret sphere includes "information which, for the advancement of a particular
business, should be kept concealed and [is], by nature, intangible and incapable of transfer....
inventive ideas ... [and] secrets licensed to the business owner." Id.
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recognized as property.52 As property, trade secret information, both
technical and commercial, deserves fifth amendment due process and
compensation safeguards.
Trade Secret Information as Property Worthy of Procedural Due
Process Safeguards
Although the fifth amendment refers to "property," the scope of in-
terests it protects differs from that protected under common law." In
determining whether particular interests are worthy of fifth amend-
ment protection as property, the Supreme Court has recognized that
property rights ordinarily arise from "existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law."5 Where such
interests are in fact recognized by an existing body of law, the Court
has reasoned that the owners of those interests have a justifiable expec-
tation that they will not be deprived of the interest without due pro-
cess.' Owners of trade secret information have been led to such an ex-
pectation. Exactly one-half of the states56 and a majority of the courts 7
addressing the issue have recognized "substantive property rights" in
trade secret information.
See id.
" See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-12 (1960). See generally Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 402, 435-36 (1977); Comment, Entitlement;
Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89. Property interests are defined
more broadly in the due process context than for takings analysis. See B. ACKERMAN,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 268-69 (1977); compare Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972), with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972). For a
discussion and criticism of the Supreme Court's approach to recognition of property rights,
see Note, Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of Property, 86 YALE L.J. 695 (1977).
" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); accord, Butner v. United States,
440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
1 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972); accord, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Costle, 481 F. Supp. 195, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). The idea of property consists in an established expectation; in the persuasion of being
able to draw such or such an advantage from the thing possessed, according to the nature of
the case. J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112 (R. Hildreth trans. 4th ed. 1882).
"See 1976 ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 212-14 (also find-
ing an additional 13 states affording some kind of trade secret protection); Epstein,
Criminal Liability for the Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, reprinted in 2 R. MILGRIM,
supra note 4, app. B-5 (surveying federal and state criminal statutes protecting trade
secrets).
s See note 46 supra.
5, Courts which refuse to adopt the property analysis generally protect trade secrets
under a tort or contract theory. F. DESSEMONTET, LEGAL PROTECTION OF KNOW-How IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 337-53 (2d rev. ed. 1976); P. GOLDSTEIN, LAW OF COPYRIGHT, PA-
TENT AND TRADEMARK 165 (1973); E. KINTNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 193-204
(1975); E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 368-69
(1972); see, e.g., Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949); Morison v. Moat, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851). See also Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO
ST. L.J. 4, 22 (1962) (recognizing six theories upon which to base trade secret protection).
The theory-property, tort or contract, for example-which states use to protect a par-
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Substantial authority, then, both legislative and judicial, supports the
proposition that trade secrets deserve protection. The Supreme Court's
expansive definition of property interests together with its recognition
of the independent sources of those interests supports the conclusion
that trade secret information is property entitled to procedural due pro-
cess. After recognizing that an agency decision to disclose trade secret
information, thereby depriving a person of his trade secret property
rights, entitles the property owner to due process, the question arises,
"what process is due?"5 9 In Mathews v. Eldridge,0 the Supreme Court
recognized that "[t]he essence of due process is the requirement that 'a
person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against
him and the opportunity to meet it.' ,6
Notice
Without clear and timely notice of the proposed action, the trade
secret information owner is helpless to protect his property interests.2
The FOIA, which focuses on disclosure and is unresponsive to the sub-
mitter's interests, does not compel predisclosure notice." Similarly,
most agencies lack regulations mandating formal notice prior to
disclosure."4 Those regulations which do provide for notification gener-
ticular interest is less important than the fact that they protect it. To warrant constitu-
tional protection, the interest must be property-like under the Roth test; that is, it must be
"created ... by existing rules or understandings." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972).
Federal agencies and Congress have recognized the legitimacy of property rights in
trade secrets by affording them general statutory protection. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 46(f)
(1976); id § 176a; id. § 1263(h); id § 2055(a)(2); 18 id § 1905; 21 id. § 331(j); id. § 360j(c); id. §
458(a)(5); 35 id. § 122; 42 id. § 263g(d); id § 263i(e); 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c) (1980); 40 id. § 2.119(b);
41 id. § 60-40.3(a). The Internal Revenue Service recognizes trade secrets as property. See
Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. (pt. 1) 133, 134; Rev. Proc. 69-19, 1969-2 C.B. 301. See generally
All About Know-How- The Tax Treatment of Unpatented Technology, 9 Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep. (CCH) 75,857 (1974).
' Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
C Id. at 348 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
" "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80
(1972) (citing Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)).
' See Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444, 448 (1975) ("If there
is no right to non-disclosure under the FOIA, the court does not perceive how there could
be a right, under the FOIA, to notice before a decision regarding non-disclosure is made.").
" See H.R. REP. No. 1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-30 (1978). But see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
2055(b)(1) (1976) (Consumer Product Safety Commission required to give 30 days notice); 40
C.F.R. § 2.204(e) (1980) (EPA required to give 15 days notice); 43 id. § 2.13(h) (Department of
Interior required to consult with submitter when possible). See generally Clement, supra
note 34, at 635; Note, supra note 27, at 609-10.
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ally leave it to the discretion of the agency. 5 Before Chrysler, adminis-
trative agencies lacked any incentive either to withhold information or
to notify the submitter of a decision to disclose." Agency personnel,
frequently unaware of the value of a trade secret to its owner, often
disclosed information without any prior notice to the provider." The
Chrysler decision creates a somewhat higher standard for discretionary
disclosures of exempt information by federal agencies. Unfettered dis-
cretion is replaced by the necessity of finding a statute or agency
regulation which specifically authorizes disclosure" and, more impor-
tantly, by the recognition that exempt trade secret information merits
protection not afforded nonexempt information. As courts,69 commen-
tators"0 and even some agencies" have noted, most agencies lack the
necessary expertise to determine whether disclosure of exempt infor-
mation would cause competitive injury to the information submitter.
The possible harmful consequences of disclosure balanced against the
Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 300 (statement of Burt A. Braverman); see, e.g.,
21 C.F.R. § 20.45 (1980) (FDA predisclosure notification conditioned on agency's preliminary
determination of disclosability). But see 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(c)(2) (Sept. 1980 Supp.) (requiring
predisclosure notification by FTC for all exemption four information marked confidential by
its supplier).
"See Patten & Weinstein, Disclosure of Business Secrets Under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act: Suggested Limitations, 29 AD. L. REv. 193, 202-04 (1977).
The need for private parties to have an opportunity to present arguments for
non-disclosure is obvious. In many cases government personnel may have no
expertise enabling them to predict the possible harm that could result from
disclosure. Moreover, without prompting by the affected interests, agency
personnel may have no incentive to maintain the confidentiality of the private
business information obtained by them under government authority. Unless
adequately apprised of the dangers of disclosure, there may be a natural
tendency for agency personnel to adopt the path of least resistance and
release information on request.
Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of Information Actk Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. app., at 331 (1977)
(statement of Coopers & Lybrand); accord, Westinghouse Elee. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542
F.2d 1190, 1213 (4th Cir. 1976), cerL denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977):
[T]here is always the real risk that the agency itself will be delinquent in
asserting the right of the private party. After all, it could not care less about
protecting the competitive position of a supplier of information. That is no
part of its responsibility. Neither does it have ... in most instances, sufficient
knowledge to assert properly the private party's right to confidentiality.
441 U.S. at 303-16. The focus of this note is on agency regulations authorizing
disclosure and not on statutes. For an example of a statute authorizing disclosure, see
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976) (mandating disclosure of financial information
concerning securities offered for public sale).
" See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1212-13 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
70 See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 38, at 1134; Note, Reverse Freedom of Information Act
Suits: Confidential Information in Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 995, 998-99 (1976).
7 See, e.g., Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 13 (statement of Gerald P. Norton,




minimal burden imposed on agencies by requiring that they notify
potentially aggrieved submitters of the decision to disclose dictates that
notice be given so that an agency may make a reasoned determination
founded on an understanding of the business and industry.
The realization that those who have submitted trade secret informa-
tion will not be notified of any threatened disclosure has led trade
secret owners either to refuse agency requests for trade secret informa-
tion 2 or to seek preliminary injunctive relief to protect their property
rights." The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which has refused to be
bound by its own assurances of confidentiality" and serves notice only
at its own discretion," has been plagued by this "pre-enforcement litiga-
tion.""6 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), meanwhile, has ef-
See, e.g., FTC v. Johns-Manville Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 78,788 (D. Colo. 1979); FTC
v. Standard Oil Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 78,711 (D.D.C. 1979).
" See, e.g., Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 616
F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1980) (district court lacked jurisdiction to hear pre-enforcement suits).
7' See FTC v. Johns-Manville Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 78,788 (D. Colo. 1979).
" See Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 13-14 (statement of Gerald P. Norton, Depu-
ty General Counsel, FTC) ("collateral arguments over the confidentiality of documents to be
produced have proven burdensome and time consuming"). For a discussion of FTC pro-
cedures generally, see Johnson, Treatment of Confidential Documents by the Federal
Trade Commission, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 1017, 1050-60 (1978). The FTC's information policies
have created a chaotic and wasteful series of challenges to FTC information requests. See,
e.g., FTC v. Johns-Manville Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 78,788 (D. Colo. 1970); FTC v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 78,711 (D.D.C. 1979); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 588 F.2d 895 (3d
Cir. 1978); FTC v. Anderson, 442 F. Supp. 1118 (D.D.C. 1977). Moreover, the agency mission
has been compromised by suspicion and a lack of cooperation between its staff and informa-
tion submitters. See H.R. REP. No. 1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-28 (1978). But see Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, §§ 3-4, 14, 94 Stat. 374
(1980) (prohibiting disclosure of "trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial infor-
mation" obtained from private sources by the FTC) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 46).
"' FTC, supra note 8, at 93. The unique nature of FTC functions necessitates use of trade
secret information in court, potentially creating disclosure problems. Nevertheless,
documents revealing trade secret information may, under FTC rules, receive in camera
treatment in adjudicative proceedings. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.45 (1980). But such treatment may
be denied where it effectively bars litigation of the issues, if "[tlhe material is not only rele-
vant, but essential to the trial of [the] action." United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp.
254, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Service Liquor Distribs. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 16
F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). To foreclose review of its information gathering authority, the
FTC unsuccessfully sought to remove from the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to
hear pre-enforcement actions, perhaps the only available remedy for submitters unable to
extract binding assurances of confidentiality or notice. See H.R. REP. No. 1557, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978) (rejected by the House, 124 CONG. REC. Hl, 019-031 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1978)). But see H.R. REP. No. 181, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (accompanying H.R. 2313,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., which was passed by the House, 125 CONG. REC. Hl, 189-206 (daily
ed. Nov. 27, 1979)). According to the FTC, the airing of pre-enforcement challenges in the
courts does "violence to the congressionally mandated scheme for resolution of [agency]
disputes" and is wasteful of agency and judicial resources. Brief for Appellees, supra note 8,
at 55-56. According to the FTC, the infusion of pre-enforcement challenges resolves in
multiple proceedings what should have been resolved in a single subpoena enforcement pro-
ceeding. Id. at 54-55. The resulting multiplicity of challenges, the FTC argued, breaks the
"very backbone of an administrative agency's effectiveness" by stalling investigations,




fectively mitigated the burden of providing notice, while guaranteeing
those making FOIA requests timely access to records." By requiring
owners to assert trade secret claims at the time of submission and by
furnishing the opportunity to substantiate those claims on threat of dis-
closure, 78 the EPA balances the two objectives without substantially im-
pairing either. This presubmission designation procedure successfully
eliminates the need for agency review of all the submitted information
which might possibly merit consideration within section 1905 or exemp-
tion four of the FOIA before making a disclosure. The EPA solution,
then, provides the submitter effective procedural safeguards while re-
quiring only a minimum commitment of resources by the agency and
while still maintaining a reasonably expeditious handling of FOIA re-
quests.79
Whether or not an agency follows the EPA procedure, basic notions
of fairness demand that administrative agencies give submitters some
form of notice prior to disclosure. While the nature of records kept and
the FOIA caseload may vary among the agencies, some form of notice
procedure suited to each particular agency is both possible and
necessary. It is essential both to a reasoned disclosure determination
and continued cooperation between the agency and information submit-
ters, and to effectuate Chrysler's recognition of APA actions. 0
Moreover, fundamental fairness and constitutional due process compel
it.
Hearing
Absent an opportunity to be heard, notice of impending disclosure
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.203-.215 (1980). See generally Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at
15-20 (testimony & statement of Michael A. James, Deputy General Counsel, EPA); Camp-
bell, supra note 34, at 196-98. The Consumer Product Safety Commission follows a pro-
cedure similar to that of the EPA. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1015.15-.19 (1980).
"' When the EPA requests information, the submitter is notified that it must assert any
trade secret claim at that time or risk disclosure without further notice. For information
provided voluntarily, the submitter merits notification only upon a FOIA request or an
agency decision to disclose the material. In deciding whether or not to disclose assertedly
exempt trade secret information, the EPA affords the submitter an opportunity to substan-
tiate his claim. Failure to successfully pursue that opportunity results in disclosure. Sub-
mitters aware of this substantiation requirement, and EPA procedure generally, have
limited their claims of trade secret status to information that is most likely entitled to con-
fidential treatment. Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 17-19 (statement of Michael A.
James, Deputy General Counsel, EPA). Following a review of the data, the submitter's
assertions of confidentiality and the likelihood of competitive harm on disclosure, the EPA's
general counsel makes a final disclosure determination. 40 C.F.R. § 2.205 (1980). See
generally Note, Protection for Trade Secrets Under the Toxic Substances Control Act of
1976, 13 U. MICH. J. LEGAL REF. 329 (1980).
1 For a discussion of the treatment afforded trade secrets by the FDA, see Spence,
FDA Trade Secret Procedures and Standards, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 362 (1980).
" See text accompanying notes 3042 supra.
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provides no more than knowledge without relief. The submitter must
have an opportunity to present reasons why his trade secret informa-
tion should not be disclosed.8 Some providers of trade secret informa-
tion argue that "an opportunity to be heard" means the right to call
witnesses in a formal hearing with an administrative law judge before
the government can deprive them of their trade secret information pro-
perty."s Supreme Court authority indicates otherwise, however. Such
oral presentations are costly and time-consuming, s" impede the congres-
sional goal of expediting FOIA requests and may not serve the need for
complete understanding of the complicated ideas, theories and facts in-
herent in trade secret release challenges.s5 Full comprehension of such
complex information often would be best achieved through a written,
rather than a spoken, medium.
"The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time
before a person is finally deprived of his property interests." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557-58 (1974); accord, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970). See generally Friendly,
"Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1281 (1975).
Since a determination of whether trade secret information should be disclosed focuses in
part on whether the information qualifies as property, ie., whether the information is a
trade secret, the hearing will necessarily consider the property issue. The assertion of a
property interest, then, invokes the right to a hearing in order to establish that interest as
well as to determine whether disclosure is authorized by law. This question differs some-
what from the traditional due process cases, such as Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), where the interest is recognized as fifth
amendment property prior to invocation of due process rights. The line of Supreme Court
cases considering due process in the debtor-creditor relationship context is instructive for
this new approach. There, the pregarnishment or preattachment hearing focuses in part on
whether property rights exist and, if so, in whom they inhere. See generally Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In addition, tradi-
tional due process cases involve hearings similar to those used to determine probable cause,
whereas a decision to disclose information is a final deprivation.
" Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 301 (statement of Burt A. Braverman).
" See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976).
See id at 347-49.
[Slince the commissions are constantly absorbed with cases that are presented
to them, they lack the time and opportunity to establish and further
regulatory priorities .... Agency staff has frequently become occupied with
legalistic solutions to problems to the exclusion or deemphasis of other
valuable input from economists, engineers, environmentalists, and persons
trained in related disciplines. Equally important is the fact that the industry
and the public in general are required to shoulder excessive costs in the
search for clear expression of regulatory policy.
THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK, REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 38-39 (1971); cf.
Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Scientifi
Economic and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111, 111 (1972) (suggesting that agencies
"ought to engage in more rule-making to avoid the slow, cumbersome, and repetitious pro-
cess of case-by-case adjudication").
" See Clement, supra note 34, at 636-37 ("It is not a major sacrifice for submitters to
rely upon written affidavits instead of expert testimony, especially since the alter-
native-providing administrative hearings for submitters-would thwart the congressional
goal of expediting FOIA requests.").
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The requirements of due process are not inflexible. Rather, they
should reflect "the precise nature of the government function involved
as well as ... the private interest that has been affected by governmen-
tal action."8 The interests of both agency and submitter necessitate
that a decision to disclose exempt information not be arbitrary or
capricious. A reasoned decision, then, requires that the agency ascertain
whether the information is confidential and therefore exempt from
disclosure. In so doing,the agency must consider the effect of disclosure
on, "[firstj the government's ability to obtain necessary information in
the future; [and secondj the competitive position of the person from
whom the information was obtained.""7 The agency's need for
deliberative decisionmaking based on a thorough evaluation of those ef-
fects and the submitter's interest in protecting his trade secret informa-
tion merit "some kind of hearing."8 8 The congressionally mandated ex-
peditious response to FOIA requests requires that the hearing be time-
ly. Litigation concerning the effects of disclosure is likely to be
technologically complex, economically sophisticated and abstract. The
evaluation of that kind of information in a hearing is challenging at best.
A formal hearing would be inappropriate since its only real advan-
tage-the opportunity to observe witness credibility and veracity-is of
minimal benefit in this context. 9 Accordingly, a written rather than oral
presentation will ordinarily satisfy both the submitter and the agency
by extending to the submitter an opportunity to present his case for
nondisclosure effectively while providing the agency information essen-
tial to a swift, reasoned determination. In addition, under such a system,
the FOIA requester would receive the timely response Congress intend-
ed. Therefore, written pleadings and affidavits provide an adequate,
perhaps superior, opportunity for submitters to vindicate their rights
" Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); ac-
cord, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 414 U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court restated and elaborated on
those criteria:
[I]dentificatiqn of the specific dictates of due process generally requires con-
sideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be af-
fected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id at 335.
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (1974).
U Friendly, supra note 81.
" See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-45 (1976) (finding a written presentation
adequate where the administrative determination turns on "routine, standard, and unbias-
ed medical reports" and not on "witness credibility and veracity") (citing Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970)).
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before an administrative agency while still satisfying due process re-
quirements. 0
TRADE SECRET INFORMATION AS COMPENSABLE PROPERTY
Disclosure destroys the value of a trade secret. Thus, disclosure to
FOIA requesters appropriates the private value of trfde secret informa-
tion for the public gain embodied in the FOIA or the disclosure-
authorizing regulation. Procedural due process, although a prerequisite
to disclosure, does not bar the deprivation of property." The fifth
amendment prohibition against taking private property "for public use,
without just compensation,"92 however, requires that the owner be com-
pensated for the trade secret information upon its disclosure, unless the
disclosure is a valid exercise of the police power. 3 More significantly,
where sovereign immunity forecloses the availability of just compensa-
tion, a taking will be enjoined. 4 Therefore, the fifth amendment com-
mand that the government compensate submitters imposes substantive
limits on an agency's discretion to disclose. 5
While the United States Supreme Court has employed a variety of
tests for ascertaining which expropriations require compensation, it
"quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula.' "96 The
Court most recently has retreated to a "fairness" standard97 wherein
those persons who would otherwise be forced to bear a public burden
"which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
o See Friendly, supra note 81, at 1281 n.79 ("Allowing such written direct testimony af-
fords great savings in time and money and often permits relatively complicated ideas,
theories, or facts to be transmitted in a form best suited to complete understanding in
situations where the value of observing demeanor is minimal."). This note does not suggest,
nor is it the case, that an agency may not, in its discretion, order a hearing.
"1 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) ("The requirement of notice and an opportuni-
ty to be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person's possessions.").
92 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93 For a discussion of the distinction between taking and regulation, see Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
" Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949); see text
accompanying note 147 infra. See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv L. REV. 1, 29-39 (1963).
" The judicial policy of avoiding constitutional questions by statutory construction, see
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331
U.S. 549, 568-74 (1947), dictates that, to the extent constitutional limitations are subsumed
into the APA, the discussion here be devoted to the statutory perspective.
" Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); accord, Harns v.
United States, 205 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir. 1953) ("A compensable taking under the federal
constitution ... is not capable of precise definition. And the adjudicated cases have steered
a rather uneven course.").
' See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
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whole"98 are compensated. This standard, in addition, subsumes all the
previously established tests for a compensable taking. When a thing
previously understood to be privately owned is permanently occupied or
regularly used or encroached upon by agents of the government or the
public generally, the fairness standard recognizes fifth amendment pro-
perty requiring compensation.9 A compensable taking also results when
a regulation or expropriation produces a "sufficiently great" diminu-
tion in the value of the property. ' Where a property owner creates a
public hazard through the use of his property right so as to require
regulation, however, the Court finds no taking.'1
The fairness theory avoids broad classifications, favoring instead a
case by case analysis."' As noted in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City,"' only the fairness theory offers some rational con-
struct for the fifth amendment taking problem."' The theory rejects any
single factor, employing instead a host of equitable considerations.
Physical invasion, diminution in value and noxious use are accordingly
proper factors to be considered when determining whether a particular
government action constitutes a taking. Additionally, "reciprocity of ad-
vantage"'' 5 considerations are appropriate in the trade secret informa-
tion disclosure context.
Traditionally, the physical invasion theory has been adopted in taking
analysis. 6 Under the physical invasion theory, the government is obli-
gated to compensate when it makes regular or permanent use of a pro-
perty interest irrespective of whether it formally transfers title in the
" Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); accord, YMCA v. United States,
395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969); United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1939).
" Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 46-49 (1960); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). See generally Michelman,
supra note 93, at 1184-90.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-16 (1922).
101 See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1953);
Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
,o See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); United
States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
"0 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
10 Id. at 123-24.
105 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), quoted in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'10 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1946) (compensation required for
destruction of chicken farm directly below military flight path). But cf Batten v. United
States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963):
The vibrations [from jet airplane operations] which cause the windows and
dishes to rattle, the smoke which blows into the homes in the summer
months . . . and the noise which interrupts ordinary home activites do in-
terfere with the use and enjoyment by the plaintiffs of their properties. Such
interference is not a taking.
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property to itself.117 A federal agency which discloses private trade
secret information and thereby permanently devotes the information to
public use could, therefore, obligate the government to compensate the
information provider for the taking. The likely existence of some
residuum of use available to the submitter does not negate that require-
ment.10
The diminution in value theory, by contrast to the physical invasion
theory, largely ignores the nature of the government act, focusing instead
on the degree of harm inflicted on the claimant's property. In Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' Justice Holmes announced that where the
value diminution caused by expropriation of property becomes "suffi-
ciently great," there will be a taking requiring compensation.1"0 "[I]f all or
substantially all of the value of the property is destroyed as a result of the
government's act,""1 , compensation must be paid.
When the value loss is less than total, courts and commentators have
had difficulty distinguishing compensable from noncompensable
takings.' Since everyone can be expected to surrender minimal property
107 See Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96 (1931) ("Confiscation may
result from a taking of the use of property without compensation quite as well as from the
taking of the title."), quoted in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 n.8 (1979);
Michelman, supra note 93, at 1184-86. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 49 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4325 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan was joined on
the taking issue by four other Justices).
" See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). But see Note, Pro-
tecting Confidential Business Information from Federal Agency Disclosure After Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 109, 131 (1980). The absence of a governmental pro-
prietary interest is similarly not relevant. See Michelman, supra note 93, at 1186.
109 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
110 Id. at 413-16.
I. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28 (1978) (reaffirming
Justice Holmes' test in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (finding a taking where the effects of
"governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy ... are so complete as to
deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter"); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-16 (1922) ("when [the extent of diminution] reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and com-
pensation to sustain the act"); see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE
208-11 (1973); Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 33-34 (1972); Michelman, supra note 93, at 1190-93; Plater, The Takings Issue in a
Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REV. 201, 228-36 (1974); Sax,
supra note 93, at 50; cf. Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 165, 175 (1974) ("[T]he average breaking point between valid regulation and taking is
at a loss of two-thirds of the admitted value for some other use.") (quoting Krasnowiecki &
Strong, Compensable Regulations for Open Space, 29 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 87, 89 (1963)).
11 No formula may be extracted from the cases for determining when a value diminution
becomes impermissible and, in the absence of compensation, unconstitutional.
Examination of a representative group of cases in which the courts
specifically mentioned proof of the value of the subject land if used for a per-
mitted purpose, as compared with its value if used for a purpose outlawed by
the ordinance, did not yield a precise formula for determining where regula-
tion crosses the line and becomes confiscation. Of the cases examined, about
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rights for the public good,"1 the courts ask how much an individual should
fairly be expected to sacrifice;14 and since no one should be expected to
give up all his rights in a thing without being compensated, the necessity
of compensation is undisputed when the value loss is total."'
Disclosure of trade secret information effects a total value loss in the
half approved and half disapproved the ordinance as applied. Moreover, the
loss of use value in cases where the ordinance was approved was about the
same as in those where an opposite conclusion was reached. If any conclusion
is warranted by this sampling, it is that financial loss is a relevant considera-
tion, but not a single decisive one.
1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.27, at 155-56 (2d ed. 1976). Compare United
States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 745-48 (1947), and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
266-67 (1946), and Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327
(1922), and United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884), with New Haven In-
clusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 489-95 (1970), and YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969),
and United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952), and Omnia Commercial
Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923), and Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
", See Interstate Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1907).
' Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). The extent of diminution inquiry
is central in inverse condemnation challenges, see, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S.
745, 748 (1947) (compensation required when the government flooded part of respondents'
land); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1946) (frequent military flights at low
altitude over a commercial chicken farm destroyed the value of the farm and necessitated
compensation for its value); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260
U.S. 327 (1922) (the frequent firing of heavy guns across the grounds of a summer resort,
thereby frightening the public off the premises, required compensation for the appropria-
tion of the property); United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884) (claimants
entitled to compensation for the appropriation of their water rights by the government),
and zoning cases, see, e.g.,Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Welch v. Swasey, 214
U.S. 91 (1909); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871); cf. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (while not explicit, the determina-
tion that compensation was unnecessary probably hinged on the "transferable development
rights" given Penn Central in return for historic landmark restrictions being placed on its
Grand Central Terminal by New York City).
Professor Michelman suggests the utilitarian approach as an alternative to the
"diminution-in-value" calculus. Michelman balances public costs against public benefits and
concludes that property qualifies as fifth amendment property requiring compensation
when the public loss from a failure to compensate exceeds the transactional costs of com-
pensation. Michelman, supra note 93, at 1215. This approach is philosophically interesting,
but not widely adopted.
M' See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979); Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947); Portsmouth Har-
bor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); accord, Goldreyer v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 641, 136 A.2d 789 (1957); Del Buono v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
143 Conn. 673, 124 A.2d 915 (1956).
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property interest.11 Once disclosed, the information is in the public do-
main and no one has a claim to it superior to that of anyone else. The
owner or developer of the information may still use it, but the law
recognizes no value in it and ceases to protect it from theft or un-
authorized use."7 Thus, to the extent that one had "a legitimate claim of
entitlement" to trade secret information, giving rise to protection as
property,"8 disclosure of the information may compel compensation. 19
The noxious use theory, or "creation of the harm" test,10 creates a
limitation on one's legitimate claim of entitlement to a thing. Under this
theory, an individual whose conduct creates the need for public regula-
tion has no claim to compensation for the diminution in value produced
by the resulting regulation. If an individual is making a nuisance of him-
self through noxious, harmful or wrongful use of his property, he may
properly be restrained without the need for government to pay compen-
sation.12 Nevertheless, if the public realizes some positive good, the
owner must be compensated.
116 The problem of delineating the property interest in land use cases, ie., what con-
stitutes the "whole" in measuring value loss, is avoided in the trade secret information con-
text where the value loss is the value of all the information disclosed. The value of commer-
cial, confidential and financial information, which is derived from the value of the ongoing
business, is totally destroyed even though the business itself continues.
"' See note 2 supra.
116 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Costle, 481
F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
19 The trade secret owner is entitled to compensation for the loss in value of his trade
secret occasioned by disclosure. He is not compensated for that which he has not
lost-what some commentators have called that "residuum of value" which he continues to
enjoy. See, e.g., McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety
Testing Information. Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARv. L. REV. 837, 866
(1980) (suggesting that "[elven when disclosed, health and safety [trade secret] data still
have a substantial residuum of value to the data producer" and, therefore, need not be com-
pensated); Note, supra note 108, at 132 (finding that FOIA trade secret information
disclosures are a regulation of property because the submitter continues to enjoy "some
residuum of value" and, therefore, such disclosures are not compensable). That the trade
secret owner is left with some residuum of use, however, does not imply that his property
was not completely destroyed, for it was. The value of the use that survives the disclosure
is without legal protection. Since property is that which the law protects, the disclosed
trade secret information is not property and has no property value. When the residuum of
value of a disclosed trade secret approaches the value of it undisclosed, the fairness stan-
dard may direct that compensation not be paid because the burden is neither unfair nor un-
just.
" See generally Sax, supra note 93, at 48-50. According to Sax, the test is "most explicit-
ly articulated" in the grade-separation cases, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1953); Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405
(1935). Sax, supra note 93, at 48-50. Those cases concerned the intersection of railroad
tracks and a highway at street level. As highway traffic increased, the legislature determin-
ed that public safety necessitated a grade separation. In upholding an assessment against
the railroad for the improvement, the Court reasoned: "Having brought about the problem,
the railroads are in no position to complain because their share of the cost of alleviating it is
not based solely on the special benefits accruing to them from the improvements." At-
chison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. at 353.
.1 Michelman, supra note 93, at 1196.
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The noxious use test suggests that when the continued secrecy of par-
ticular information creates a public hazard which disclosure will
mitigate, such disclosure need not be compensated. Thus, for example,
where a trade secret information owner exploits its property to further
some harmful end such as monopolization or consumer fraud, govern-
ment disclosure of the information may constitutionally be accomplished
without the need to pay compensation. Nevertheless, while secrecy in
government is a recognized public hazard which the FOIA seeks to
abate"' and a danger which disclosure of trade secret information might
arguably help to overcome, the rule denying compensation does not ex-
tend so far. Under the creation of the harm test, since the submitter did
not create the danger, its property may not be sacrificed in order to
alleviate the harm without just compensation.
While the idea of justifying an exercise of the police power by "an
average reciprocity of advantage" between the public and the property
owner has traditionally been applied' in zoning cases,"' the notion is
capable of a broader conceptual application. Under this theory, if the
government confers a benefit upon the public by diminishing the value
of an individual's property, it must confer some reciprocal, offsetting
benefit upon the aggrieved individual.' Such an offsetting private
benefit in trade secret information disclosures may be found, if at all, in
the "economic advantages of a license"' obtained from the government.
To suggest, as has at least one commentator, 2 ' that an aggrieved sub-
mitter of trade secret information, by having access to data submitted
by others, gains a reciprocity of advantage, is to view the disclosure prob-
lem myopically. The FOIA does not, nor was it intended to, provide
disclosure sufficient to fulfill reciprocal access demands of
competitors." Were the Act to provide such free access to government
held trade secret information, important technological development in-
centives would vanish."' Even with free access, if the government
possessed trade secret information from only one participant in a
'" See note 20 supra.
123 See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1911).
124 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Jackman v. Rosenbaum
Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Wurts v.
Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606 (1885).
1 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 555 F.2d 82, 95 (1977).
" See Note, supra note 108, at 131.
' See note 11 supra.
12 [I]t is hard to see how the public would be benefited by disclosure of customer
lists or advertising campaigns; in fact, keeping such items secret encourages
businesses to initiate new and individualized plans of operation, and construc-
tive competition results. This, in turn, leads to a greater variety of business
methods than would otherwise be the case if privately developed marketing
and other data were passed illicitly among firms involved in the same enter-
prise.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
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market, for example, no free accessibility advantage would inure to that
participant's benefit since it could obtain no information complementary
to its own. Less than free access, that is limited disclosure, however,
would deny some submitters access to potentially compensating infor-
mation. While reciprocity might be found if the submitter could obtain
from the requesting competitor like information, the FOIA specifically
forecloses such a consideration." Nevertheless, an agency which ob-
tains standardized information from an entire industry 3 " may decide to
make that line of information freely available. The costs and benefits of
such an information exchange would inure to all competitors in an in-
dustry and reciprocity would be assured. 3'
One who voluntarily submits trade secret information in exchange for
a license or other economic advantage with the knowledge that the
information may be disclosed has received the reciprocal benefit
necessary to overcome fifth amendment taking objections.' 3' Unlike in-
voluntary submission or submission with nondisclosure guarantees,
such voluntary submissions effect a knowing abandonment of certain
property rights in exchange for other property rights.'" The benefits,
by flowing to the submitter prior to public disclosure, guarantee some
certainty of reciprocity and thereby ensure constitutional approval.
Moreover, the decision to disclose rests with the submitter and not the
government. By permitting the submitter to decide whether or not to
bear the burden of public disclosure the constitutional requisites of
fairness are met.
Reciprocity of advantage suggests that an exercise of police power
must not only benefit the injured property owner but must also benefit
the public-that is, be "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
'" Prior to disclosure, the agency must consider the nature of the information requested,
but may not consider the identity of the requester. Agencies must respond to FOIA re-
quests and "shall make the records promptly available to any person." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)
(1976) (emphasis added). "[T]he Act clearly intended to give any member of the public as
much right to disclosure as one with a special interest therein." NLRB v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975).
130 See, e.g., In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978).
"I See Note, The Freedom of Nonfree Information: An Economic Proposal for Govern-
ment Disclosure of Privately Submitted Commercial Information, 32 STAN. L. REV. 339
(1980) (proposing that agencies become information exchanges).
Category one information, see text accompanying note 44 supra, will almost never be
held as a line of information for an industry. The disclosure of such information would not
create reciprocal benefits and, therefore, would be barred by the reciprocity of advantage
test. Category two information, meanwhile, frequently will be held for an entire industry
and will achieve reciprocal benefits through disclosure. The availability of such benefits
must be determined for each line of information on a case-by-case basis.
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 555 F.2d 82, 95 (1977).
"3 See note 53 supra.
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substantial public purpose"'"-as well. Congress, in enacting the FOIA,
recognized a substantial public interest in disclosure of information
generally, but specifically denied any such interest in trade secret infor-
mation disclosures ' because of the minimal public need for such infor-
mation. '38 Given that the vast majority of FOIA requests come from
businesses,"7 ostensibly to obtain competitively advantageous informa-
tion, and that few, if any, of the requests for exempt trade secret infor-
mation produce material which furthers the goal of a public educated in
the operation of its government," it seems doubtful that many trade
secret information disclosures are justifiable as being for the public
good." 9 While the FOIA is an expression of Congress' desire to promote
'u Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). The question of
compensation is mooted if the taking on its face benefits only a private interest. Courts,
however, generally defer to the legislative determination of public purpose. See, e.g., Ber-
man v. Paker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("[Wihen the legislature has spoken, the public interest
has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."); United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327
U.S. 546, 552 (1946) ("[W]hatever may be the scope of the judicial power to determine what
is a 'public use' . . . , this Court has said that when Congress has spoken on this subject 'Its
decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.' ") (quoting Old
Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)). See also Thompson v. Con-
solidated Gas. Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) ("[O]ne person's property may not be taken
for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose even though
compensation be paid."). "[A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.," regardless
of compensation, "cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1798) (seriatim opinion). At least one court has held that
disclosure of private trade secret information held by the government is an unconstitutional
taking of private property for private purposes. See Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589,
589-99 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 616 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1980). The Wearly
court reasoned that information released to a private requester is ipso facto for a private
purpose. 462 F. Supp. at 589-99. The clear aim of Congress in enacting the FOIA, however,
was public gain. See notes 11 & 20 supra. Congress sought a heightened public awareness
"with respect to the nature, scope and procedure of federal governmental activities."
Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418; S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). While no one suggests a total failure to achieve
that aim, some commentators point to the unexpectedly high cost of administering the Act
as an indication of the need for a "comprehensive restructuring" of it. Koch & Rubin, A
Proposal for a Comprehensive Restructuring of the Public Information System, 1979 DUKE
L.J. 1, 5-7. Nevertheless, the Act.has facilitated generally free access to governmental in-
formation even though conferring some benefit, arguably an overwhelming portion of the
ascertainable benefit, on private requesters. See notes 13-16 supra. Given the deference ac-
corded legislative intent by the United States Supreme Court, Judge Biunno's opinion in
Wearly is clearly inapposite to FOIA disclosures.
' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976); see National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498
F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [19661
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2427; S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
'' See Arnold, supra note 12, at 19 ("90 percent of all the information sought is probably
of no interest to anyone except the party requesting it").
13? See note 12 supra.
13 See notes 11, 13-16 supra.
' But see McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 119, at 840-48 (discussing the desirability of
disclosing health and safety data submitted to the FDA and EPA as a prerequisite to licens-
ing new drugs and pesticides).
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openness in government,' it fails to provide sufficient authority for a
taking of trade secret information.'
Thus, if the disclosure of trade secret information does not restrain
its owner from a noxious use of the information or if there is no
reciprocal benefit, either at the time of tje initial information submis-
sion or through a broad and accessible line of information, the disclosure
will likely result in a taking for which the fifth amendment directs com-
pensation. Money damages are available in the court of claims if Con-
gress has waived sovereign immunity by authorizing the disclosure.4 2 In
such a situation, the constitutional demand for compensation is satisfied
by the legal remedy4 and the equitable remedy of a declaratory judg-
ment or an injunction is, therefore, foreclosed. 4 If Congress has not
authorized the disclosure, however, an equitable remedy is the only
available relief.' Thus, if a government officer acts in excess of his
delegated powers or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, "his ac-
tions are ultra vires his authority and therefore may be made the object
of specific relief."'46 In the trade secret information context, if the
disclosure is authorized and is a valid exercise of administrative discre-
tion, Congress has impliedly authorized the exclusive remedy of com-
pensation. If, however, the disclosure is not authorized by law, is ultra
vires or is otherwise an abuse of discretion, the submitter may enjoin
the agency or officer from disclosing the informationY"
While Chrysler may indicate that a disclosure of information made
pursuant to a regulation having the "force and effect of law" is authoriz-
ed by law and therefore allowable under the APA, the broader limita-
tion imposed by the fifth amendment may dictate a different result.
Agencies should recognize that the fifth amendment compensation re-
quirement imposes a substantive limit on their discretion to disclose
trade secret information. 8 In the absence of a showing of noxious use or
"o See note 20 supra.
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303-04 (1979).
See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-27 (1974); Yearsly v.
W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940). Money damages are also available if the
disclosure is a valid exercise of administrative discretion. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
"' See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 697 n.18 (1949).
Id.; Spevack v. Strauss, 257 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1958), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 359 U.S. 115 (1959).
145 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949).
"4 The submitter whose property is destroyed in violation of the fifth amendment also
has "a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of
any statute conferring such a right." Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). See also
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
1" The APA is as broad as the fifth amendment takings clause. See Hoffman v. HUD, 519
F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1975) (recognizing that the APA grants a claim for relief for an ad-




reciprocity of advantage, disclosure of trade secret information con-
stitutes an abuse of discretion voidable under the APA. The constitu-
tional standard is a more stringent limitation on agency action with a
broader application than that imposed by the Chrysler rule. This stan-
dard will produce both economic efficiency "9 and social benefits.
Moreover, it is constitutionally compelled.
CONCLUSION
The administrative treatment afforded trade secret information has
failed to protect valuable property rights adequately and results in
diminished productivity,, innovation and cooperation with agencies re-
questing information. Application of constitutional standards to trade
secret disclosure determinations will insure adequate protection of
those rights, greater access to information for non-business requesters
and continued cooperation between trade secret owners and ad-
ministrative agencies. By guaranteeing procedural due process,
especially adequate notice, agencies will expand their access to valuable
and necessary information while stimulating, rather than discouraging,
technological development. Use of the fifth amendment compensation
requirement as a limit on agency discretion will acknowledge the
substantial value inhering in private proprietary information and will
encourage production and efficiency. Application of this heightened con-
stitutional standard of appropriate administrative discretion for FOIA
disclosure requests will further the important national policy of protect-
ing confidential business information'50 while leaving intact the design of
the FOIA intended by Congress."5 '
RICHARD W. YOUNG
, For an economic analysis of government disclosure of trade secret information and a
suggested reform of the system based on economic-not legal-criteria, see Note, supra
note 131.
"' See notes 22 & 128 supra.
IS, See notes 20-25 & accompanying text supra.
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